The Right to Counsel and Due Process in Probation Revocation Proceedings: Gagnon v. Scarpelli by Jenkins, Douglas C.
Cleveland State University
EngagedScholarship@CSU
Cleveland State Law Review Law Journals
1974
The Right to Counsel and Due Process in
Probation Revocation Proceedings: Gagnon v.
Scarpelli
Douglas C. Jenkins
Follow this and additional works at: https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, and the Criminal Law Commons
How does access to this work benefit you? Let us know!
This Case Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at EngagedScholarship@CSU. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Cleveland State Law Review by an authorized editor of EngagedScholarship@CSU. For more information, please contact library.es@csuohio.edu.
Recommended Citation
Case Comment, The Right to Counsel and Due Process in Probation Revocation Proceedings: Gagnon v. Scarpelli. 23 Clev. St. L. Rev.
151 (1974)
The Right to Counsel and Due Process
In Probation Revocation Proceedings:
Gagnon v. Scarpelli
N MAY 14, 1973, THE WORST FEAR of at least one commentator was
borne out' by the opinion of the Supreme Court in Gagnon v.
Scarpelli.2 Justice Powell, writing for the Court, recognized certain
due process rights of the individual who has been convicted and placed
on probation. The Court refused to adopt a per se right to represen-
tation by counsel as an element of due process in probation revoca-
tion proceedings, however. The opinion has left the meaning and
importance of due process in grave doubt, has retarded the progres-
sion of penal-correctional reform, and has insured a heavy docket for
an already overburdened appellate system by a return to the unwork-
able rule formulated in Betts v. Brady.3
The factual history of the case began when Gerald H. Scarpelli
was convicted of armed robbery in the state of Wisconsin, sentenced
to fifteen years of imprisonment, and subsequently placed on proba-
tion for a period of seven years. Under a "Parole Agreement and a
Travel Permit and Agreement to Return," Scarpelli was allowed to
return to his home in Illinois where he was arrested the following
month for burglary. Based on an unsigned confession, allegedly made
under duress, his probation was summarily revoked without a hear-
ing or the benefit of counsel. He had not been prosecuted for the al-
leged burglary, and the voluntariness of the confession was never
determined by a court of law.4 After retaining counsel, Mr. Scarpelli
appealed the revocation of his probation.
The Federal District Court in Wisconsin held that the lack of a
hearing prior to probation revocation was a violation of due process.
More importantly, it found that substantial rights were involved at
such hearings and that the assistance of counsel was required.' In
concluding that counsel was necessary, the court followed numerous
1 See Ruben, The Burger Court and the Penal System, 8 CRIM. L. BULL. 31, 40 (1972). Sol
Ruben here warned that the effects and likely result of the Burger Court's review of correc-
tional law cases would be adverse to reform.
2 Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973), rev'g 454 F.2d 416 (7th Cir. 1971).
3316 U.S. 455 (1942).
4 Scarpelli v. Gagnon, 317 F.Supp. 72 (E.D. Wisc. 1970).
1 Id. at 76.
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decisions' which had allowed an expansive interpretation of the right
to counsel in probation revocation proceedings under Mempa v. Rhay.7
The reasoning behind the District Court's opinion was undoubtedly
the "fair play" doctrine of due process and equal protection as af-
forded by the fourteenth amendment. The undisputed point was that
* . substantial rights of the probationer are involved at a proba-
tion revocation hearing. The probationer's liberty hinges on the out-
come of the hearing. "
The decision of the District Court was affirmed on appeal.9 In
elaborating on the reasoning of the lower court, Judge Fairchild found
that the question of whether the assistance of counsel at the revoca-
tion proceeding is necessary, turns on the function which counsel is
to serve.10 The Court of Appeals determined, as had the Supreme
Court in the analogous decisions of Goldberg v. Kelly11 and In re Gault,"
that the right to be heard would be of little avail if it did not com-
prehend the right to be heard through counsel.13
In reversing the Court of Appeals, the majority of the Supreme
Court adopted a different viewpoint. Following the reasoning of
Justice Powell in his concurrence in Argersinger ov. Hamlin,14 the
majority confined to its narrowest sense the earlier opinion in Mempa
v. Rhay.1 s In addition to the limitation of Mempa as to the necessity
of counsel at a deferred sentencing, a valuable note of the court ex-
plains that the opinion to follow would apply equally to parole and
probation revocation proceedings. 16
6See Annot., 44 A.L.R.3d 306. Courts in Florida, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Texas, and
Wisconsin have specifically refused to follow the narrow interpretation of Mempa v. Rhay,
389 U.S. 128 (1967), that counsel need be appointed only if the revocation proceedings
were also a deferred sentencing proceeding. Illinois, Massachusetts, New Mexico, New York,
Ohio, and Oregon had provision for counsel at such hearings whether sentencing had been
imposed or not, but did not necessarily appoint counsel per se. See also Hewett v. North
Carolina, 415 F.2d 1316 (4th Cit. 1969); Scarpelli v. Gagnon, 317 F.Supp. 72 (E.D. Wisc.
1972); Gargan v. State, 217 So.2d 578 (Fla. App. 1969); State v. Atkinson, 7 N.C. App.
355, 172 S.E.2d 249 (1970); In re Callyar, 476 P.2d 354 (Okla. Crim. 1970); Ex Parte
Bird, 457 S.W.2d 559 (Tex. 1970); Ex Parte Fuller, 435 S.W.2d 515 (Tex. 1969).
7389 U.S. 128 (1967). The Court in Mempa allowed for appointment of counsel at revoca-
tion proceedings only when sentence had not been passed, in accordance with Washington
State statutes on sentencing.
8 Scarpelli v. Gagnon, 317 F.Supp. 72, 77 (E.D. Wisc. 1970).
9 Scarpelli v. Gagnon, 454 F.2d 416 (7th Cir. 1971).
10 1d. at 422.
11 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
12387 U.S. 1 (1967).
3 See Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932), where this philosophy concerning the right to
counsel had its original inception.
14407 U.S. 25 (1972).
15 389 U.S. 128 (1967).





The decision initially, and with few reasons given, finds that
there is a right to due process in revocation proceedings which in-
cludes the right to both a preliminary and final revocation hearing, 17
in accordance with Morrissey v. Brewer)8 The opinion then shifts to
the right-to-counsel question, and centers on the Court's concept of
the duties, attitude, and functions of the probation or parole officer.
The majority had determined that the role of these officers is to help
determine the welfare of their clients and at the same time meet a
primary duty to protect the public. The duty of these officers is the
supervision of rehabilitation, and thus revocation is a last resort to
be used only when treatment fails. In further discussion of the role
of the officer, the Court demonstrates a concern for the officer's neutral
status. To insure that a probationer or parolee not have his freedom
unjustifiably taken away, it is necessary that the officer not be forced
into a prosecutorial role.19
It would seem that the Court's opinion rests upon extremely
frail grounds. The "major" authority in support of the majority
opinion in the area of probation, is a casebook on the administration
of criminal justice.20 In addition, the Court recognized, but seemed
unconcerned with, the lack of vitality which attaches to the due
process rights of the accused when counsel is not present.21 The pri-
mary force behind the acceptance of such an egregious attitude was
the firm belief that most probation-parole violations occur as the
result of the commission of another crime.2 A recent study would
seem to indicate that this basic assumption is unfounded.H
The Court gives various reasons for the denial of a per se right
to counsel, among which are the costs that would be imposed upon the
criminal justice system and various collateral disadvantages which
would hinder the operation of the revocation proceedings. It recog-
nizes that the case-by-case approach, which it had adopted for a
17 Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 782 (1973).
18408 U.S. 471 (1972). These due process rights give the probationer a right to have the
initial hearing held as near as possible to the locality where the probation violation has oc-
curred. The Court in Gagnon realizes this procedure will necessitate a modification of the
Interstate Compact. Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 782-83 (1973). The due process
rights afforded in Morrissey, and extended here, are listed by the Court as those of notice,
opportunity to appear and present evidence, a conditional right (in the interests of safety of
informers) to confront adverse witnesses, an independent hearing body, and a written report
of the decision made. Id. at 786. The final hearing includes these same rudiments of due
process but is less summary in that it considers revocation rather than the preliminary issue
of probable cause for such; see Cohen, A Comment on Morrissey v. Brewer: Due Process and
Parole Revocation, 8 CRIM. L. BULL. 616 (1972).
19 Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 785 (1973).
20 1 d. at n. 7 & 8 (REMINGTON, NEWMAN, KIMBALL & GOLDSTEIN, CRIMINAL JUSTICE AD-
MINISTRATION: MATERIALS & CASES 910-11 (1969)).
21 Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 786-87 (1973).
2Id. at n. 10.
2 FINAL REPORT OF THE OHIO CITIZENS TASK FORCE ON CORRECTIONS E6 (1971).
1974]
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determination of the necessity of counsel, will cause problems; but
holds that since revocation proceedings are not part of the criminal
prosecution, they do not invoke the full protection of the sixth amend-
ment.24 In concluding, the opinion sets forth the following test to
determine when counsel is necessary: When the probationer-parolee
makes a good faith request to the court, and when there are com-
plexities in the hearing that a layman would be unable to cope with,
counsel must be provided. The final paragraph of the opinion recog-
nizes that there are such complexities in granting the writ of habeas
corpus, and strongly suggests that Scarpelli be furnished counsel.2 5
The basis for the decision is that the probation-parole revocation pro-
ceeding is not part of the criminal trial,26 and therefore does not
require the same high degree of protection afforded to juveniles,27
or others within the criminal process.26
General Analysis: The Sixth Amendment
The fact that the Court devoted the first one-third of its opinion
to an explanation and justification of the Morrissey and Mempa de-
cisions gives insight into the reasoning and negative impact which
flow from the Gagnon decision. The effect of this portion of the
opinion was to make an unconvincing differentiation between proba-
tion revocation hearings and the criminal prosecution, thus avoiding
certain constitutional guaranties. After eliminating the petitioner's
sixth amendment argument, the Court then focused its unsympathetic
view on the elements of due process.
Of further disconcert is the summary fashion in which it decided
that revocation proceedings are not part of the criminal sentencing
process which requires the appointment of counsel.2 9 The sixth amend-
ment approach would seem to be the most logical reasoning for the
Court to have followed for several reasons. First, probation itself
should be seen as an alternate sentencing process; once imposed, it
reflects the opinion of the sentencing judge that probation will be
the best means of rehabilitation for the individual and best serve
society's desires. Any prison sentence imposed by the court at the
time of granting probation should be looked upon as a means of
coercion to insure compliance with society's goals as they pertain to
24 Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 788-89 (1973).
25Id. at 791.
26 Id. at 790.
7Id. at n. 12; In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
28 Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 788-89 (1973).29See ABA PROJECT ON STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROBATION, 3, 21, 25, §1.1
(1970) [hereinafter cited as ABA STANDARDS: PROBATION). This study recommends that
the revocation process be an independent sentencing process within the criminal action, and




the probation-parole status. The major obstacle to accepting the
separate sentencing theory, however, is the need to accept the modern
goal of penology as the reintegration and rehabilitation of the of-
fender. Strangely enough, the Court here accepted the second pre-
mise,30 but failed to logically follow with the acceptance of the first.
It would seem that if probation or parole is to further the accepted
goals of rehabilitation and reintegration, then it must be assumed
that revocation of an individual's status would occur only as the re-
sult of the failure of the enumerated goals. 31 Such failure should be
unquestionable and total; these goals are certainly beyond recogni-
tion where the individual is placed in a penal institution.3 2 In light
of the reasoning for revocation, such proceedings should entail a full
hearing within the criminal process to determine if a failure of the
stated goals has in fact occurred, and if so, to impose a new sentence
which would attempt to promote rehabilitation and reintegration. In
espousing these methods to best utilize the sentencing process, it is
accepted that revocation of probation-parole is often a means of retri-
bution enforced against the individual for his failure to conform with
meaningless and absurd rules which have little if anything to do
with the penal-correctional process.33
A second theory under which the right to counsel should attach
is that developed under the "loss of liberty" concept, discussed later
in this Comment. The basic contention in the "loss of liberty" theory
is that any time a person's liberty is in jeopardy, even if it be con-
ditional liberty, all rudiments of due process which attach to the
criminal trial should attach to such other proceeding. The presence
of counsel at trial is to insure, among other things, that a person is
not subjected to the loss of liberty without due process of law. There-
fore, the actual importance and necessity for counsel arises in the
probation-parole revocation proceedings just as in the criminal trial
itself.34
The American Bar Association has specifically recommended that
the judiciary be free of handcuffs which allow little discretion on its
3 Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 785 (1973), where this theory is accepted by the Court.
See also ABA STANDARDS: PROBATION 1-2.
31 ABA STANDARDS: PROBATION §5.1.
32 See Benzanson & Sigler, Role Perception Among New Jersey Probation Officers, 2 RUT.-CAM.
L.J. 251 (1970); ABA STANDARDS: PROBATION 67; Klockors, A Theory of Probation Su-
pervision, 63 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 550 (1970); PRESIDENT'S TASK FORCE REPORT: COR-
RECTIONS, CH. 3, PROBATION 27 (1967).
3 See FINAL REPORT OF THE OHIO CITIZENS TASK FORCE ON CORRECTIONS E6 (1971),
which indicated that approximately 50% of recommitted parolees in Ohio were recommit-
ted for technical violations, not for new crimes; this is in direct conflict with the assumptions
of the Gagnon Court, n. 10. See generally Bass, Comment: Discretionary Power and Pro-
cedural Rights in the Granting and Revoking of Probation, 60 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 979
(1969).
34See Menechino v. Oswald, 430 F.2d 403, 415 (1970) (Feinberg, J., dissenting).
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part in imposing and enforcing a sentence, technically imposed at
trial.35 The A.B.A. would provide a revocation hearing which would
essentially be an extension of the sentencing process. This proceeding
would impose a burden of proof upon the state to determine a viola-
tion in fact, grant the judge discretion to impose a sentence other
than the one previously imposed, and of paramount importance, grant
a per se right to counsel under the sixth amendment.36 The Gagnon
Court did not see the issue in this perspective in their summary ap-
proach to the sixth amendment, and although they recognized the
Chewning v. Cunningham37 "critical stage" of the criminal process
approach, they ignored the historical events which had required the
decision in Gideon v. Wainwright.38 The realization is plain that Gideon
could have been decided on due process grounds, avoiding the equal
protection and sixth amendment questions; but the Court in Gideon
took notice of the number of appeals it was receiving on this issue,
the number of states already providing counsel, and the injustice that
too often occurred when counsel was not present.39
Further support for the per se appointment of counsel in revoca-
tion proceedings is provided by the decision in Townsend v. Burke,40
where a state prisoner's writ of habeas corpus was granted in the
interest of "fair play" because there was an absence of counsel dur-
ing sentencing. By analogy, Kadish believes that this illustration
of the critical nature of sentencing should apply to the revocation
proceeding, as an extension of the sentencing stage of the criminal
proceeding. 41 The failure of the Court to make such an extension is
extremely disappointing in light of its reluctance to fully scrutinize
the penal-correctional field.42 The decision is in direct opposition to its
demonstrated concern for the protection of the constitutional rights
of the accused43 in the areas of pre-trial4 4 and sentencing. 5
35 ABA STANDARDS: PROBATION, §§1.1 (f), 5.5, n. 66.
36Id. at 66-69.
3
' Chewning v Cunningham, 368 U.S. 443 (1962).
3Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
3
'See A. LEWIS, GIDEON'S TRUMPET (1964).
4
1 Townsend v. Burke, 334 U.S. 736, 741 (1948).
41 Kadish, The Advocate and the Expert-Counsel in the Peno-Correctional Process, 45 MINN.
L. REV. 803 (1961).
42 See e.g., Comment: The Parole System, 120 U. PA. L. REV. 282, 339 (1971).
43 See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968); Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965);
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
44 See Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1 (1970); United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967);
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
41 Specht v. Patterson, 386 U.S. 605 (1967); Townsend v. Burke, 334 U.S. 736 (1948). See
also Comment: The Parole System, 120 U. Pa L.: Rev. 282, 339 (1971).
[Vol. 23:151
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1 GAGNON V. SCARPELLI
Due Process
Since the Court refused to adopt the sixth amendment right-to-
counsel approach, its recognition of certain due process rights and
the value of these rights to the unrepresented probationer/parolee,
makes the opinion all the more unconvincing. The opinion openly
recognized that:
Despite the informal nature of the proceeding and the ab-
sence of technical rules of procedure or evidence, the unskilled
probationer or parolee may well have difficulty in presenting
his version of a disputed set of facts where the presentation
requires the examining or cross-examining of witnesses or
the offering or dissecting of complex documentary evidence.46
Why the Court should feel that these problems are not always pres-
ent at a revocation proceeding, and what the true rationale behind its
denial of a per se right to counsel may be, are only speculative. The
conclusion that due process is not so rigid as to sacrifice informality,
flexibility, and economy,47 revives thirty years of problems by pre-
senting the probation/parole revocation process with a return to the
unworkable Betts v. Brady,0 case-by-case or "unusual circumstances 49
test to determine when counsel is required at a revocation proceeding.5 0
In retrospect, it is unfortunate that the Court in Morrissey5' did
not reach the question of whether a parolee was entitled to retained
counsel. This would have been a logical step after reaffirming the
concept that the constitutional right to due process does not turn on
whether a governmental benefit is characterized as a "right" or a
"privilege".- Gagnon" followed the same path of purblind caution
in the failure to fully grasp and cope with the issue of the right to
retained counsel.55 If in fact a probationer has certain due process
rights, regardless of the sentence posture, the logical corrollary would
seem to uphold the right to retained counsel. While the Court does not
absolutely refuse to deal with the retained counsel question, it avoids
the due process questions it raises by finding the subject not in issue.5 6
4 6 Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 786-87 (1973).
471 Id. at 787.
4316 U.S. 455 (1942).
49/d,
50 Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 787 (1973).
51 Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972).
12 Id. at 475.
53Id. at 476; see Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 374 (1971).
s4 Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973).
1 Id at 784 & n. 6.
56 Id,
1974]
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The Court's approach to the right to counsel question is one which
avoids an in-depth analysis of sixth amendment rightsY while at the
same time ignoring numerous cases which deal with important due
process aspects of the case.- It also ignored the impact of the "critical
stage of the proceedings" test which resulted from such recent deci-
sions as Escobedo,59 Miranda,60 and Townsend.
61
The Role of Probation
An aspect of the opinion which merits analysis, in that it would
seem to have a great bearing on the Court's philosophy, is the need
which the Court found to protect the relationship of the probation
officer and the probationer. Apparently, the Court's concern with this
relationship was interwoven with an idealistic view as to how the
probation/parole system operates. It evidently assumed that the pro-
nounced goals of the probation operations had been achieved within
the system today. Unfortunately, this is an anachronistic view. It
makes little, if any, difference to this analysis whether present pro-
bation/parole personnel are seen as sincere men doing a difficult job,
or are viewed in a much less favorable light.62 The emphasis should
be on the fact that such officers are not lawyers and that the pres-
ence of an attorney at the revocation proceedings would insure the
rights of the probationer. 3
Professors Sigler and Benzanson, in a study of role perception
among probation officers," concluded that the officer is not primarily
interested in the welfare and rehabilitation of the client, but only
that probation be and remain an economical substitute for incarcera-
tion. 6S In response to a portion of their study they found that only
24% of the officers surveyed saw themselves as social or correctional
social workers," that the officer is primarily concerned with retaining
5 See, e.g., Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335
(1963).
11 See, e.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 379 U.S. 254 (1970); Cafeteria and Restaurant Workers Union
v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886 (1961); Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath, 341
U.S. 123 (1951).
S9Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
60 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). See also United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218
(1967).
61 Townsend v. Burke, 334 U.S. 736 (1948).
62 See Menechino v. Oswald, 430 F.2d 403 at n. 12 and 13 (2d Cit. 1970) citing Jackson, The
Parole Board, 69 LIFE, July 10, 1970, at 54 and GAYLIN, IN THE SERVICE OF THEIR COUN-
TRY, WAR RESISTERS IN PRISON, 332-42 (1970).
63 See Kadish, The Advocate and the Expert Counsel in the Peno-Correctional Process, 45
MINN. L. REV. 803, 829-830 (1961); PRESIDENT'S TASK FORCE REPORT: PROBATION 27,
28-37 (1967).
6Sigler & Benzanson, Role Perception Among New Jersey Probation Officers, 2 RUT.-CAM.
L.J. 251 (1970).
61 Id. at 263.




his job status,6 7 and that less than 35% of the probation officer's time
is allocated to interviewing his clients. The percentage of time spent
in interviewing is especially relevant when considering that the mean
caseload of those interviewed was ninety-six probationers," consider-
ably above the maximum of thirty recommended by the President's
Task Force Report.69 The problems which develop in the probation/
parole field due to large case loads are not unique to this New Jersey
sample: 67% of all felony probations during 1965 were found to be
supervised by personnel with case loads of over one hundred individ-
uals.70 Knowledge of the complications of large case loads, coupled
with the individual attitudes of probation officers, the often absurd
and nonsensical rules and restrictions placed on the probationer,71
and the unproven effects of the probation process, 2 leave one with the
impression that the Gagnon3 Court did little in-depth research into
this complicated field, and placed unwarranted reliance on a certain
few lawyers.74 Apparent in its further analysis of the probation of-
ficer's position, is the fear of the Court to thrust the officer into the
role of a prosecutor. This is an unrealistic view in that the probation
officer has already been placed in such a role. It is invariably the
officer's report and recommendation which determine the outcome of
a revocation hearing. The officer's role would in no way be compro-
mised by appointment of counsel and the initiation of an adversary
process. The assumptions of the Court regarding the role of probation
officers would seem to be merely that - assumptions which are un-
founded in the real world.75
All of the reasons given by the Court to justify their opinion that
providing counsel would impose direct costs, alter the nature of the
proceeding, endanger the good will of hearing bodies, and prolong the
hearing process, 76 are equally weak arguments which will be discussed
more fully." The culmination of the opinion rests in a "boiler plate"
test for use in the lower courts so that they may know when to pro-
67Id.
68Id. at 262.
69 PRESIDENT'S TASK FORCE REPORT: PROBATION 29 (1967).
70 Id. at 30.
71 Klockers, A Theory of Probation Supervision, 63 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 550, 550-57, 554
(1972).
72 See Vasoli, Some Reflections on Measuring Probation Outcome, 31 FED. PROB. 24 (1967).
73Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973).
74 Id. at 789.
75 See e.g., Kadish, The Advocate and the Expert-Counsel in the Peno-Correctional Process, 45
MINN. L. REv. 803 (1961).
76 Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 786-87 (1973).
7 See The Court's Rationale, infra at text accompanying notes 129-137. See also PROCEEDINGS
OF THE 89TH ANNUAL CONGRESS OF CORRECTION OF THE AMERICAN CORRECTIONAL
ASSOCIATION, WORKSHOP V. COMMITTEE ON PAROLE BOARD PROBLEMS 83 (1959).
19q4]
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vide counsel. The test is of the same nature as that espoused in Betts
v. Brady,78 and will prove to be as unworkable as that test. 9 An over-
view of Gagnon would indicate that the decision is one made not on
the merits, but rather that it is the culmination of the Court's pres-
sure to weaken the representation of offenders generally.8 0
The Opinion
Perhaps the most interesting aspect of the Gagnon opinion is that
it is an eight-to-one decision by a Court which has often divided five
to four in the decision of criminal law matters.81 The only dissenter,
Justice Douglas, devoted a mere four lines to an opinion based upon
the facts of Gagnon and due process.82 He referred the reader to his
concurrence and dissent in Morrissey v. Brewer8 3 where he stated that
"the parolee should be entitled to counsel," but there left his em-
phasis to a footnote 5. Although the reader can but speculate as to
the reason for the lack of a vigorous dissent, perhaps the Court actually
felt that it had insured due process in the probation or parole revoca-
tion proceeding.
The reasoning of the Court in this decision is interesting in its
similarity to that of Justice Powell's concurrence in Argersinger,"
decided one year earlier. In Argersinger, Justice Powell had called
for principles of fairness (due process) rather than the per se right
to counsel where one is faced with a possible deprivation of liberty
as adopted by the majority." Such principles of fairness would have
required an exercise of discretion by the lower courts for the appoint-
ment of counsel in accordance with due process requirements," a
'a 316 U.S. 455 (1942).
79 See text accompanying notes 96-102, infra.
80 See Chief Justice Burger's speech to the American law Institute, criticizing overzealous
lawyers, NEW YORK TIMES, May 19, 1971.
81 This reflects this author's empirical research of criminal law decisions of the Burger Court.
The majority of the Court in these cases consists of Burger, C.J., joined by Rehnquist, White,
Blackmun, and Powell, JJ.; while the minority, led by Douglas, J., consists of Brennan,
Stewart, and Marshall, JJ. Examples of this division of the Court on criminal cases from
April 24 to June 25, 1973, follow: United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423 (1973); Chaffin
v. Stynchcombe, 412 U.S. 17 (1973); Miller v. California, __-- U.S. , 93, S.Ct. 2607
(1973); Paris Adult Theatre v. Slaton, -_ U.S. _, 93 S.Ct. 2628 (1973); Kaplan v.
California ,...... U.S., 93 S.Ct. 2680 (1973); United States v. 12,200 ft. Reels of Super
8mm Film, ..... U S -......93 S.Ct. 2665 (1973); Gilligan v. Morgan, _ U.S - ,----- 93
S.Ct. 2440 (1973); Heller v. New York, --- U.S ...... , 93 S.Ct. 2789 (1973); Roaden v.
Kentucky, ____ U.S. 93 S.Ct. 2796 (1973).
82 Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 791 (1973).
83408 U.S. 471, 498 (1972).
4 Id.
8 Id. at 500.
86Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972).





return to the Betts v. Brady9 "special circumstances" rule,90 and a
similar three-pronged test for use by the lower courts. 91 The only dis-
cernible rationale for the shift of the majority of the Court to Justice
Powell's point of view is that the Court has finally determined the
fine line between those rights which are necessary, and those rights
which are fundamentally necessary, as distinguished in the Betts92
and Gideon 93 decisions. In the latter, a per se right to counsel was
necessary to insure the protection of a fundamental right. The Gagnon
decision has evidently disparaged the sixth amendment right to
counsel as forewarned by Kirby v. Illinois,94 but sooner than commen-
tators had predicted.95
The Betts v. Brady Approach
The return to the ineffectual rule96 earlier set forth in Betts v.
Brady97 is a troubling aspect of the Gagnon decision. The opinion con-
tains no reasoning which would lead the reader to believe that the
case-by-case determination of "special circumstances" which require
the appointment of counsel would be more effective today than it was
ten years ago. The appellate courts must eventually evaluate the
special circumstances of each case to determine which circumstances
will invoke the due process right to counsel. This is an especially
troubling thought when the Supreme Court, through its Chief Justice
and its opinions, has attempted to curb the number of appeals being
taken.98 The increase in litigation which must of necessity arise from
this decision is apparent by reviewing the test provided for the
lower courts.99
It would seem that a prerequisite to the application of the Court's
test for a determination of the necessity of counsel is that the pro-
bationer or parolee must first be informed of his right to request the
89316 U.S. 455 (1942).
90 Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 45 (1972).
91 Id.
92 Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942).
91 Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
94406 U.S. 682 (1972).
9
'See 22 CLEVE. ST. L. REV. 367, 372 (1973). See also Bute v. Illinois, 333 U.S. 640, 682
1948) (Douglas, J. dissenting).
96Text accompanying notes 47-50, supra; between 1950 and 1963 the Court could find cases
where "special circumstanses" were not found. Harlan stated that, "In truth, the Betts v. Brady
rule is no longer a reality." See generally Kamisar, Betts v. Brady Twenty Years Later: The
Right to Counsel and Due Process Values, 61 MICH. L. REV. 219 (1962). Note that Kamisar's
article is most interesting in that it was written on the eve of the Gideon decision and right
after the decision in Chewning v. Cunningham, 368 U.S. 443 (1952), a case which many felt
left Betts v. Brady with little, if any, vitality.
97316 U.S. 455 (1942).
•( L61) 16L '8LL "Sfl I I V '!Ildl-S *A uoua'0O 66
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assistance of counsel. It is doubtful that such information will be pro-
vided by the court where Gagnon affords only a contingent right to
counsel. Where the accused is advised of such a right, his request must
be based on a:
... timely and colorable claim ... that he has not committed
the alleged violations . . . or ... that there are substantial
reasons which justified or mitigated the violations . . . and
that the reasons are complex or otherwise difficult to develop
or present.100
It would seem that every person, whether represented by counsel or
not, would assert these claims. The courts have recognized that the
latter portion of this test is nearly always applicable to the criminal
proceeding.
Even the intelligent and educated layman has small and
sometimes no skill in the science of law .... He lacks both
the skill and the knowledge adequately to prepare his defense
(or mitigation), even though he has a perfect one. He requires
the guiding hand of counsel at every step in the proceedings
against him. Without it, though he be not guilty, he faces
the danger of conviction (or loss of freedom) because he does
not know how to establish his innocence. 101
The probable outcome is that the actual use and benefit of his
right to request counsel will go the same route as those various due
process rights extended in Morrissey. It will exist on paper but will
not be administered with the same diligence as it would be to the
individual who stands before the court with an attorney.10 2
The Due Process Approach
The most provocative aspect of Gagnon is its effect upon the
meaning of the fourteenth amendment due process clause. Generally
we may say that due process embodies the differing rules of fair play
which, through the years, have become associated with differing types
of proceedings.10 3 Yet due process requires more than mere fair play.104
It requires that the Court have the wisdom to insure that the em-
pirically correct decision prevails. The criminal justice system, the
United States Constitution, and the high ideals of the American sys-
100OI.
101 Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 69 (1932); accord, Chandler v. Fretag, 348 U.S. 3 (1954).
102 See Cohen, A Comment on Morrissey v. Brewer: Due Process and Parole Revocation, 8 CRIM.
L. BULL. 616, 616-22 (1972).
103In re Tucker, 5 Cal.3d 171, 486 P.2d 657, 95 Cal.Rptr. 761 (1971).
1




tem demand that justice be administered without regard to race, creed,
status, wealth, or history - but rather solely on the basis of what is
right.
Though the Court faced the reality that many of the due process
rights afforded in Morrissey would be meaningless without the bene-
fit of counsel, it had apparently determined that it had proceeded far
enough in the protection of constitutional rights.105 The Court has
evidently found that the elusive boundaries of due process are deter-
minable, and have no remaining elasticity; the result is a preservation
of the status quo.
Though the elements of due process may vary with the type and
nature of the proceeding, and a probation revocation proceeding may
be characterized as non-criminal to avoid the sixth amendment, there
is little doubt that the requirements of due process apply to this ad-
judicative proceeding. 106 The essence of due process affords protection
of the individual from arbitrary action at the revocation proceed-
ings.107 The derogation of due process in Gagnon is determined by the
treatment of revocation proceedings in the same manner as other pro-
ceedings where imprisonment is not at stake.108 Arbitrariness in the
revocation of probation or parole has consequences which are much
more severe upon the individual than arbitrariness in the termination
of a civil status, however. To prevent the arbitrary incarceration of
an individual, logic would seemingly require the assistance of counsel.
It is interesting to compare Gagnon's failure to extend a per se
right to counsel under a due process approach with other recent de-
cisions of the Court involving due process and right to counsel. In
many judicial, quasi-judicial, and administrative areas of the ad-
judicatory process, the protection of due process rights necessarily
include the right to be represented by counsel. The most notable de-
cision was Goldberg v. Kelly109 which rejected any distinction between
the characterization of a right or a privilege in the determination of
whether to apply due process. In rejecting this distinction, the Su-
preme Court found that the termination of welfare benefits required
a hearing at which the indigent party was entitled to representation
by counsel. " 0 Certain state courts have followed this approach, ex-
'
05 See Scarpelli v. Gagnon, 454 F.2d 416 (7th Cir. 1971).
106 Cafeteria and Restaurant Workers Union v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886 (1961).
107 Ohio Bell Tel. Co. v. Public Util. Comm'n, 301 U.S. 292, 302 (1937).
106See Goldberg v. Kelly, 379 U.S. 254 (1970); Sherbet v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963);
Willner v. Committee on Character & Fitness, 373 U.S. 96 (1963).
109 379 U.S. 254 (1970).
110 d at 270.
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tending the right to counsel under due process requirements to parole
revocation proceedings.111 In New York, Chief Justice Flud in the
Menechino1 case determined that the federal Constitution demands
that counsel be provided in revocation proceedings."' He reasoned
that the purpose of counsel was merely to afford added protection to
the accused and to assure that all pertinent facts were before the
hearing body, to assure an accurate determination as to whether or not
there should be a revocation.'
The most compelling outline of the necessity of counsel in any
proceeding where liberty is at stake, and one as viable today as it
was over forty years ago, is that in Powell v. Alabama.
What then does a hearing include? Historically and in prac-
tice in our country at least, it has always included the right
to the aid of counsel when desired and provided by the party
asserting the right. The right to be heard would be in many
cases, of little avail if it did not comprehend the right to be
heard by counsel.
If in any case, civil or criminal, a state or federal court were
arbitrarily to refuse to hear a party by counsel, employed
by and appearing for him, it reasonably may not be doubted
that such a refusal would be a denial of a hearing and there-
fore, of due process in the constitutional sense.115
The right to appointed counsel for indigents under both the sixth
and fourteenth amendment provisions has developed over this forty-
year period. 116 Disregarding, for the moment, the question of appointed
counsel, it seems apparent that Powell v. Alabama and various state
decisions would recognize that a right to retained counsel does exist. 17
"I See Warden v. Palumbo, 214 Md. 407, 135 A.2d 439 (1957); Menechino v. Warden, 27
N.Y.2d 376, 318 N.Y.S.2d 449 (1971); Commonwealth v. Tinson, 433 Pa. 328, 249 A.2d
549 (1969).
11227 N.Y.2d 376, 267 N.E.2d 238, 319 N.Y.S.2d 449 (1971).
113 See also Combs v. LaVallee, 29 App.Div.2d 128, 286 N.Y.S.2d 600, appeal dismissed, 22
N.Y.2d 857, 293 N.Y.S.2d 117 (1968), where the right to counsel had previously been ex-
tended in revocation proceedings under the due process clause of the 14th amendment of the
New York State Constitution.
714 Menechino v. Warden, 27 N.Y.2d 376, 318 N.Y.S.2d 449, 455 (1971).
115 Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 68-69 (1932).
116 Goldberg v. Kelly, 379 U.S. 254 (1970); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
'17 See Annot., 44 A.L.R.3d 306. Cases cited note 6 supra. The following states have held that
there is a right to counsel where, as in Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128 (1967) sentence re-
mains to be imposed; most also recognizing the right to retained counsel: Ala., Ariz., Cal.,
Colo., Fla., La., Me., Md., Mass., Mich., Mont., Neb., N.J., N.Y., N.D., Ohio, Ore., Pa.,
R.I., Tex., Wash., W.Va., & Wisc. See eg., Winchester v. State, 45 Ala.App. 24, 221 So.2d
700, (1969); State v. Walter, 12 Ariz. App. 282, 469 P.2d 848, (1970); State v. Miller,
19 Ohio St.2d 180, 249 NE.2d 920 (1969); In re Collyar, 476 P.2d 354 (Okla., 1970);
Ex parte Bird, 457 S.W.2d 559 (Tex. 1970). See also MODEL PENAL CODE, §301.4 which




The right to retained counsel is further supported by the decisions in
Chandler v. Fretag8 and Ferguson v. Georgia 9 where the courts de-
termined that regardless of whether the petitioner would have been
entitled to the appointment of counsel, his right to be heard through
retained counsel was unqualified. 120 It is interesting to note that these
cases reaffirmed Powell, which was supposedly overruled by Betts, 121
in a fashion that completely ignored the Betts decision. It is possible
that Gagnon will meet the same end.
Equal Protection Problems
The logical corrolary to the right to retained counsel is an argu-
ment for the equal protection of indigents through the appointment
of counsel. 22 The equal protection problems raised by the Court's de-
cisions, while conveniently abandoned, were essential to the issues
presented. "[T] he presence of counsel in some cases when it is denied
in others gives rise to equal protection problems."'23 This aspect of
the decision will no doubt be heavily litigated in the immediate future
where thirty-seven of fifty-four jurisdictions already permit the pres-
ence of retained counsel at parole revocation hearings.24
The very basis of equal protection lies in the thesis that each man
will stand equal before the law, without regard to the stage of the pro-
ceeding. The concept that a probation revocation proceeding is not
criminal in nature where sentence has previously been imposed, thus
avoiding sixth amendment and due process rights, 12 is inconsistent
with previous case law. 126 It would appear to be a weak rationalization
for a predrawn conclusion. The Court, while relying on fine distinc-
tions, avoided the clear reality that the loss of personal liberty is at
stake in every revocation proceeding. 127 Kamisar and Choper have
118 348 U.S. 3 (1954).
119365 U.S. 570 (1961).
120 Chandler v. Fretag, 348 U.S. 3 (1954). See also TASK FORCE REPORT: CORRECTIONS, supra
note 23, at 86.
121 316 U.S. 455 (1942).
122372 U.S. 335 (1963).
123 Perry v. Williard, 427 P.2d 1020, 1024 (Ore. 1967); see Douglas v. California, 372 U.S.
353 (1963); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956). Though a right to appeal may not
necessarily be constitutionally protected, if such a right does exist, equal protection demands
that it be as accessible to the indigent as it is to the more affluent, thus in scope answering
the very question avoided in Gagnon.
17 O'Leary & Nuffield, Parole Decision-Making Characteristics: Report of a National Survey,
8 CRIM. L. BULL. 651 (1973). The 37 jurisdictions allowing retained counsel are: U.S.
Board of Parole, Ala., Alas., Ariz., Ark., Del., D.C., Fla., Ga., Hawaii, Idaho, Ill., Iowa, Md.,
Mich., Mo., Neb., Nev., N.H., N.Y., N.C., N.D., Okla., Pa., R.I., S.C., S.D., Tenn., Tex.,
Utah, Vt., Va., Wash., W. Va, Wisc., & Wyo. See also Sklar, Law and Practice in Probation
and Parole Revocation Hearings, 55 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 175 (1964). Sklar demonstrates the
changes from pre-Mempa law.
125 See Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128 (1967).
126 See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967); Specht v. Patterson, 386 U.S. 605 (1967).
12 See ABA STANDARDS: PROBATION, §§1.1, 1.3.
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most adequately stated the correct approach to revocation proceed-
ings. "[A] decision on the continued liberty of an individual should
be made judically, in light of all relevant factual data, and with ade-
quate procedural safeguards."''
The Court's Rationale
The most sincere justification for the opinion would seem to be
the Court's statement that the provision of counsel would impose
"direct costs and serious collateral disadvantages"''2 on the revocation
process. The majority concluded that the right to counsel would alter
the nature of the proceedings, that the hearing body would become
akin to a judge, and that the process would be prolonged. 3 In making
such determinations, the Court failed to demonstrate that the pro-
ceeding are not already adjudicatory in nature. In fact, it would seem
that the hearing does entail receiving evidence, that the hearing body
does have the power to incarcerate the defendant, and many other
powers essential to a trial judge. The final determination is limited
to the issue of incarceration or freedom of the accused, however. Plac-
ing such a premium on the "collateral disadvantages" to the revoca-
tion process is a derogation of due process. As Judge Celebrezze of
the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals has asserted: "neither the nature
of the governmental function nor fear of disruption of that function
can justify the denial of [due process].'1'a In making the preceding
statement, Judge Celebrezze was concerned not only with arbitrary
and capricious action by revocation authorities, but with the insight
that such authorities too often acted without hearing all of the per-
tinent evidence.1 3 2
It would plainly seem that the assistance of counsel is necessary
to insure that the accused be given a fair hearing. The fears as to the
cost of appointed counsel33 have been shown to be groundless.13 4 The
128Kamisar & Choper, The Right to Counsel in Minnesota: Some Field Findings and Legal
Policy Observations, 48 MINN. L. REv. 1 (1963).
29 Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 787 (1973).
130 Id.
131 Rose v. Haskins, 388 F.2d 91 (6th Cit. 1968) (Celebrezze, J. dissenting).
3 Id. at 104.
' Kadish, supra note 41 at 838-39. In Michigan, even though the right to counsel in revoca-
tion proceedings has existed since 1937, none of the "calamities" seen by the Court in
Gagnon have yet to occur there. Maryland has had similar positive results in its proceedings
which also allow for the presence of counsel.
134 See ADMINISTRATION OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS, 1966 ANNUAL REPORT 128. The
cost of supervising a person on probation for one day was 67V compared to the cost of im-
prisonment for one day, $7.54. This disregards the added benefits of the probationer's in-
come, avoidance of governmental support for his family, and the imposition of the prison
stigma. This demonstrates, assuming that a like dollar-to-cents ration exists today, that




Miranda,3 ' Escobedo,3 6 and other decisions which displayed a con-
cern for individual rights were not founded in fear of costs to the
justice system, but designed to insure the ultimate reliability of the
sentencing process. '37
In failing to follow the reasoning of the Gideon decision "that the
layman defendant is not able to adequately protect his fundamental
rights . . ." the Court ignored precedent which demonstrates an
identical need for the protection of a probationer-parolee's rights. 39
It has failed to realize that the probationer/parolee, like the juvenile,
requires the protection afforded by counsel in order to "cope with the
problems of law, to make skilled inquiry into the facts, to insist upon
regularity of the proceedings and to ascertain whether he has a de-
fense, and to prepare and submit it.1 ' 40 Perhaps the only raison d'etre
for Gagnon lies in the rationalization that constitutional due process
and equal protection rights do not fully apply once a person's guilt
has been determined.141
The Proper Perspective
In formulating change in the penal-correctional process, it is
necessary to consider the injustice which results from the deprivation
(Continued from preceding page)
monetary costs of appointing counsel could be balanced against the money saved in insuring
that only those who need be incarcerated are in fact incarcerated. See also the OHIO TASK
FORCE REPORT cited note 23, supra, which would indicate that nearly 50% of those whose
parole was revoked might not have been re-incarcerated if counsel had been present.
135 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
'36 Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
137 Our system of justice has been built on the adage that it is better for several guilty persons
to go free, than for one innocent person to have his liberty denied. The essence of this adage
has been the assurance that persons accused of wrongdoings have been afforded various pro-
tectory rights, lumped under the heading of due process. It would seem to be axiomatic that
these same due process rights should be afforded when liberty is at stake in the revocation
process.
'38 Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963); see 18 U. KANSAS L.R. 686 (1970).
139 See Fleming v. Tate, 156 F.2d 848 (D.C. Cir. 1946). The defendant's parole was revoked at
a parole hearing because the defendant left the District of Columbia without written per-
mission from his parole board. It appears that the defendant misunderstood the exact con-
ditions of his parole. He did not obtain permission to leave the District, but this permission
was obtained from his parole sponsor who had no authority to give such permission. How-
ever, these facts were not adequately presented at the parole hearing because the defendant
was not allowed to be represented by counsel or to present witnesses. In Moore v. Reid, 246
F.2d 654 (D.C. Cir. 1957), the defendant's parole was also revoked as a result of certain
misunderstandings. The Moore court felt that if the defendant had been allowed to be rep-
resented by counsel that these misunderstandings might not have occurred. These two cases
and the Turner revocation hearing indicate the benefit that may be had from right to counsel
in a probation revocation hearing. For a discussion of Turner, see infra, at text accompanying
notes 156-159.
140In re Gault 387 U.S. 1 (1967). See generally, 12 WAYNE L. REv. 638 (1966).
141 The problem with this approach is that Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963), and
Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956), do not agree with the equal protection theory. This
matter was not taken up by the Gagnon Court.
142 See Ruben, The Burger Court and the Penal System, 8 CRIM. L. BULL. 31 (1972).
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of a right to counsel142 in light of the necessity for probation. Proba-
tion is designed to promote the rehabilitation 43 and reintegration of
an offender as a productive member of society. 14 The commitment to
the theory is evident in the statistics compiled by the President's Com-
mission on Law Enforcement and the Administration of Justice's
Task Force Report of 1967.145
The first practice of probation began prior to 1850 in Massa-
chusetts,146 with the enactment of a modern procedure of probation.47
Originally classified as a matter of grace and not of right,14 no con-
stitutional rights attached to a grant of probation. 149 In Escoe v.
Zerbst,150 Justice Cardozo's dicta insured the extension of such views
and overshadowed those seemingly more enlightened aspects of the
opinion which recognized the validity of certain constitutional rights.
The Mempa decision in 1967 required that counsel be provided
for the offender where sentence had not yet been passed.151 The after-
math of Mempa found a majority of states following the requirements
set forth by the Court,1 2 with a minority extending a right to counsel
to all revocation proceedings regardless of the sentence posture.15
While the status of the right to counsel in the revocation proceeding
remained uncertain and presented no uniform rule,15 the common
thread was the notion of insuring the application of due process of
law.15S
Perhaps the powers exercised by a revocation authority, and the
possible abuses that may occur without the presence of counsel, can
best be illustrated by an analysis of People v. Turner.1 5 6 In Turner, the
1 Burns v. United States, 287 U.S. 216, 220 (1932); Springer v. United States, 148 F.2d 411
(9th Cit. 1945).
144 ABA STANDARDS: PROBATION 1.1(a), at 1, 2, 22.
145 TASK FORCE REPORT: CORRECTIONS, supra note 23, at 202.
14 6 E. SUTHERLAND, PRINCIPALS OF CRIMINOLOGY 383 (1947).
147 MASS. ANN. LAws, ch. 276, §83 (1955).
148 Burns v. United States, 287 U.S. 216 (1932).
149 Escoe v. Zerbst, 295 U.S. 490 (1935).
150 d.
"' Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 125 (1967).
s2See Annot., 44 A.L.R.3d 306, 315.
lS3Id, at 321-27.
1
s4See generally U.S. ex rel Bey v. State Board, 443 F.2d 1079 (2d Cir. 1971); People v.
Burrell, 334 Ill. App. 253, 79 N.E.2d 528 (1960); Williams v. Commonwealth, 350 Mass.
732, 216 N.E.2d 779 (1966); Blea v. Cox, 75 N.M. 265, 403 P.2d 701 (1965); People v.
Warden, 27 N.Y.2d 376, 318 N.Y.S.2d 449 (1971); Perry v. Williard, 247 Ore. 145, 427
P.2d 1020 (1967). Note that Ohio and various other jurisdictions have held that an accused
is entitled to counsel and appointment in certain instances, but have expressly held there is
no per se right to such. Compare Thomas v. Maxwell, 175 Ohio St. 233, 193 N.E.2d 150
(1963) with State v. Nowak, 91 Ohio App. 401, 108 NE.2d 377, app. denied, 157 Ohio
St. 525, 106 N.E.2d 82 (1952).
155 See ABA STANDARDS: PROBATION, Parts I and. IV.




probationer had been convicted of the attempted sale of narcotics and
placed on probation upon the condition that he go to a hospital under
the care of a Dr. Burnett. The probationer obeyed the court's instruc-
tions but left the hospital the next day, immediately reporting to pro-
bation supervision. Four months later the probationer was arrested,
charged with violating probation in leaving the hospital, and at a hear-
ing held by the original trial judge found guilty of the breach.
The essence of the finding by the court was that the probationer's
case history, and the reports of his probation officer, showed that he
"demonstrated a sincere, cooperative, and mature attitude regarding
the conditions of probation imposed and [there were] no reports of
misconduct or the use of narcotics ..."151 Other evidence at the revo-
cation proceedings showed that probationer, a negro, may have been
arrested because he was seeing a white girl. Fortunately the case
was reversed on appeal. But when one questions due process and the
right to counsel in this area of the law, let him ask where this proba-
tioner would have been without the aid of the attorney he was able
to retain. This is an area where dangers of abuse are real and full
procedural safeguards are appropriate.'% The fact that probation is
not a matter of right does not justify the termination of probation
by methods which are patently unfair.159
Probation must not be viewed as a quasi-judicial or administra-
tive area of the law. In its proper perspective it is a real and viable
part of the criminal law system.' 60 The basic need for the acceptance
of this reality lies in the fact that probation revocation should serve
a constructive purpose. A plan should be formulated in the best inter-
ests of the probationer, his family, and the community which will
facilitate and promote rehabilitation.' 61 Little is gained when the court
makes its disposition for the sake of punishment only.' 62 The need for
such a perspective is based upon the reasoning that:
The right to personal liberty is one of the most sacred and
valuable rights of a citizen and should not be regarded lightly.
The right to personal liberty may be as valuable to one con-
victed of crime as to one not so convicted, and... he may not
be deprived of the same [without due process of law] .
l57Id. at 145, 276 N.Y.S.2d at 412 (1967).
lB See FINAL REPORT OF THE OHIO CInzENS TASK FORCE ON CORRECTIONS (1971). Tech-
nical violations account for approximately 50% of parole revocations.
159 MODEL PENAL CODE §301.4, comment; see Kadish, The Advocate and the Expert-Counsel
in the Peno-Correctional Process, 45 MINN. L. REV. 803 (1961).
160 Comment: Discretionary Power and Procedural Rights in Granting & Revoking Probation,
60 J.CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 479, 483 (1969).
161 See ABA STANDARDS: PROBATION §§1.1, 1.2, 1.3.
162 DiCerba, When Should Probation be Revoked? 30 FED. PROBATION 2:11, 14 (1966).
163 State v. Zolantakis. 70 Utah 296, 259 P. 1044, 1046 (1927).
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Thus it would seem that the value of legal representation in protect-
ing the freedom of an individual is as critical to one who has been
placed on probation as it is to one who has not yet received a definite
sentence.1"
Two further disadvantages of the revocation process as it pres-
ently exists are the vast discretion given to the revocation authority
and the widespread policy of revocation based on a new violation for
which the probationer is never tried. 65 The latter practice seems to
contradict the proposition that a person is innocent until proven guilty.
It further interferes with basic rehabilitative goals and aspects of
fundamental fairness by sending a person to prison without establish-
ing that he has committed a crime.'"
A means of halting the automatic conviction may lie in the ap-
plication of a collateral estoppel doctrine similar to that applied in
Ashe v. Swenson;167 such an approach is not without precedent.'6 But
in order to be effective, such an approach would require that the pro-
bationer be given a trial on any subsequent charge and that the result
of that trial would be collateral estoppel as to identical issues at a
revocation hearing. Thus, if an individual were determined innocent
at a trial, there may be no need for a revocation hearing. If there were
such a hearing, the revocation could not be based on the charges for
which the probationer had been acquitted.
Though discretion of a judge is an accepted part of our judicial
system, it has been subject to the control and guidance of precedent,
written opinions, rules of procedure and evidence, statutory mandate,
and an appellate process. In a revocation proceeding, held without
formal proceedings or guidelines, and without benefit of counsel, it is
inevitable that arbitrary and unreasonable decisions will be made. It
is unfortunate that such discretion exists, for the importance of the
hearing is as great as that in the original sentencing and there is the
same need for an informed decision 69 The probationers or parolees
164 United States v. Connecticut Bd. of Parole, 443 F.2d 1079 (2d Cir. 1971); California v.
Youngs, 23 Cal. App. 3d 180, 99 Cal.Rptr. 901 (1972) (dictum).
16
s See 30 FED. PROB. 2:11.
166 See, e.g., Thompson, Effective Advocacy in a Probation Revocation Hearing, PRACT. LAW
3:69 (1971).
167 Ashe v. Swenson, 97 U.S. 436 (1970).
168 State v. Sullivan, 127 S.C. 197, 198, 212 SE. 47, 50-51 (1923) (dissent); State v. Renew,
136 S.C. 302, 132 S.E. 613, 614 (1926). Judge Cotham used the collateral estoppel doctrine
to point out the necessity of trying a probation violator on the new charge in order to deter-
mine if in fact there had been a violation predicated on the alleged act.
169 See Cohen, Sentencing, Probation and the Rehabilitative Ideal: The View From Mempa v.




who are subject to what could be an arbitrary loss of freedom without
adequate procedural safeguards gain little respect for the revocation
process. It is a difficult blow to those who have already demonstrated
an inability to cope with society. 170
The reasons and necessity for the presence of counsel may be
pursued ad infinitum. As previously discussed, the basic goal is that
of fairness. The right to be represented by counsel is basic to our sys-
tem of justice, whether the proceeding be civil,'71 criminal,172 or ad-
ministrative in nature.1 3 The legal system can no longer afford to
allow the probation/parole systems to fashion and enforce their own
processes, 74 if those processes adversely affect the criminal justice
system.
Douglas C. Jenkinst
170 See generally 60 J. CRaM. L.C. & P.S. 479, 485-89 (1969).
171In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
172 Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
173 Administrative Procedure Act, §6(a), 60 Star. 237, (1946), APA Rev., §555 (b).
174 See Cohen, Sentencing, Probation and the Rehabilitative Ideal: The View From Mempa v.
Rhay, 47 TEx. L. REV. 1, 9 (1968).
t Third year student, The Cleveland State University College of Law.
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